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Makino Shinji didn't speak up to stop Mishima's complaints at this moment. The construction of the heavy industry center was a big pie, and the reason why everyone supported the Navy in making this pie was naturally so that they could get a slice. Otherwise, why would everyone block the passage of the private railway nationalization plan? Wasn't it just that the private railway nationalization plan would only allow a small group of people to get a piece of the pie?
Lin Xinyi was not embarrassed and continued to Mu Ye: "Actually, the heavy industry center is not finished once it is built. After the steel plant is built, it must start production, and the produced steel must be sold. Only after these two steps are completed can the heavy industry center sustain itself."
The Navy doesn't object to everyone coming in and sharing the benefits, but it's not fair to come in and only share the benefits. To gain something, one should give something in return; that's only fair. Mr. Makino, what do you say?
Makino glanced at Matsukata Kojiro, who sat quietly there. He now understood why Hayashi Shinichi had brought him along. As the president of Kawasaki Shipyard, the plan for this heavy industry center was indeed unavoidable. Although Kawasaki Shipyard was a Kawasaki family business, the Matsukata family actually held a significant stake in it. Otherwise, Matsukata Masayoshi wouldn't have gone to such lengths to sell a state-owned shipyard to the Kawasaki family.
After a long silence, Makino finally asked, "So what does the Navy intend for us to do?"
Lin Xinyi calmly picked out a document from the files and placed it in front of Makino, saying, "This is a telegram sent back from India by Mr. Inoue Kakugoro. He investigated the local iron ore situation in India and believes that India has high-quality iron ore, which is better than that of Daye Iron Mine."
Then Lin Xinyi picked out another document and said: "This is a telegram sent to me by my friends in China and India. The Indian People's Committee went to the United States to investigate the American steel industry in the first half of last year. It just so happened that the US stock market crashed in the second half of the year, so many American steel mills fell into operational difficulties. The representatives of the People's Committee contacted the US Steel Company and negotiated the purchase of the closed steel mills. Later, the Labor Party in Wuhan also joined the negotiations."
From the second half of last year to the first half of this year, the economies of Europe and the United States did not recover. Instead of seeing a recovery in domestic and international markets, the US steel industry received more bad news. Therefore, US steel companies made significant concessions on selling steel production capacity, willing to sell some capacity at low prices to close steel mills they deemed uneconomical.
Although these steel mills being sold all have a capacity of less than 20 tons, they are considered quite advanced equipment for the East. The US steel industry will likely sell steel mills with a total capacity of 200-300 million tons this time. China and India may not be able to absorb that much, as they face difficulties in financing in the international market.
My idea is that Japan should send representatives to participate in these negotiations and then allocate a portion of its steel production capacity to the Chiba Prefecture heavy industry center. This would not only significantly reduce construction costs but also establish a coal-iron joint venture partnership with China and India. We would assist China and India in securing financing in the international market, while they would export coal and iron ore to us. We would then sell the processed steel back to China and India in exchange for agricultural raw materials, which we would then process and sell on the international market to pay for international loans and interest. In this way, all parties could benefit…”
Chapter 633
Makino naturally knew Mr. Inoue Kakugoro, a member of the House of Representatives and the managing director of the Hokkaido Coal Mine Railway. The Hokkaido official development plan, led by Kuroda Kiyotaka, was ultimately forced to be sold to private individuals due to insufficient national funds. The Hokkaido Coal Mine Railway was the most valuable part of Hokkaido's many official assets, so it was also privatized by various powerful figures at a low price.
When the Hokkaido Development Commission was abolished and the Hokkaido Agency was established, the first governor, Michitoshi Iwamura, criticized Kuroda's practice of selling all government assets to private individuals. Although he later turned to a development model of government investment in infrastructure and then selling it to private capital due to practical difficulties, he still believed that Hokkaido's railway facilities should not be sold to private individuals.
Although Hokkaido's area is slightly larger than two times that of Kyushu, its population is only about one-tenth of the latter's, and more than half of the population migrated there after the establishment of the Meiji government. At that time, Hokkaido was similar to northern Manchuria and Outer Mongolia in China, or the Russian Far East, with most areas being desolate mountains and wilderness uninhabited. Therefore, the only means of connecting the various settlements in Hokkaido, besides ocean-going ships, were inland railways. Railways were far more important than shipping because most of Hokkaido's resources were located inland.
The current situation is that the shareholders of the Hokkaido Coal Mine Railway feel that Hokkaido is too desolate, the railway has never been very profitable, and the maintenance costs of the original narrow-gauge railway are getting higher and higher with the years. The Hokkaido Prefectural Government, on the other hand, believes that if they want to further open up the inland areas, they must reduce railway freight rates, otherwise no one will be willing to go inland to develop, since the profits will ultimately be taken by the railway company.
Therefore, both the government and private sectors in Hokkaido actively promoted the nationalization of private railways. Inoue Kakugoro, as the managing director of the railway, was actively involved in this process, making him a familiar face to Makino. As a strong advocate for railway nationalization, he should logically have opposed the heavy industry center construction plan, since this plan was the very factor that ultimately ousted the railway nationalization proposal.
However, Inoue Kakugoro has now gone to India to inspect the quality of Indian iron ore, which means that some supporters of the private iron ore nationalization plan are also aligning themselves with the Navy, preparing to get a share of the heavy industry center plan. Makino, who is ambitious in political career, certainly understands what this means. It means that the Navy has not only not offended anyone by opposing the nationalization of private iron ore, but has also won over a group of powerful figures.
This also means that after the Navy forms a cabinet, those who originally supported the nationalization of private railways may not necessarily oppose the Navy. The Navy has gained a group of allies both politically and economically. As a result, the next Navy cabinet will inevitably be more stable than the Ito cabinet. After all, the last time Ito formed a cabinet, it was the result of compromise among all parties, and not many people truly supported the Navy. But this time it is different. Many powerful figures whose interests align with the Navy have no choice but to support the Navy, because only the Navy can guarantee their interests.
If we think about it more deeply, isn't this a small threat to their faction? The group of powerful figures represented by Inoue Kakugoro actually consisted of a lot of the Satsuma clique's core supporters. The reason why Kuroda Kiyotaka and Saigo Tsugumichi are recognized as leaders of the Satsuma clique, while Yamamoto Gonbei and Ito Sukeyuki are not, is because the former two have supporters in the military, business, and political circles, while the latter two's supporters did not extend beyond the military.
Matsukata Masayoshi was nominally the head of the Satsuma clique, but in reality, his influence over the military was not high. The Satsuma faction within the military only accepted Matsukata's position if they had a senior figure who could provide political and economic support. Therefore, Matsukata Masayoshi had no say in personnel matters within the Navy; he could only seek the Navy's agreement on certain issues.
However, now that the Navy has won over people from the political and economic circles, it means that the Navy's future connections with these circles will no longer need to go through this faction. If they cannot reach an agreement with the Navy, then the Navy may abandon them and start anew.
So while Mishima and Matsukata were still engrossed in Hayashi Shin-yi's proposal for Japan-China-India coal and iron cooperation, it was indeed an excellent plan, a point Makino acknowledged. The best part of this plan was not actually the economic aspect, but rather that it gave Japan the opportunity to exert economic influence over China and India.
Both China and India are populous countries. Although British India cannot be considered an independent nation-state—it was a colonial region that bound together many South Asian ethnic groups and small states under the colonial rule of the British Empire—it was still the world's second most populous country, with more than twice the population of Russia, the world's third most populous country.
The combined population of Japan, China, and the UK accounts for nearly 40% of the world's population, which means it is an extremely large market that has been largely untapped. The British ruled India for over a century, yet the Indian people are even less familiar with modern civilization than the Japanese. Although cities like Mumbai and Calcutta have highly modernized white residential areas, these have nothing to do with the Indian people.
Makino's extensive knowledge of India stemmed not only from his passion for diplomacy but also from the surge of India fever that arose in Japan after Britain's defeat in India at the hands of the Chinese. While the Japanese, after forming the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, lauded Britain to the skies, seemingly believing that an alliance with Britain would guarantee Japan's status as a first-rate civilized nation, they were also pleased to see the world's leading power suffer losses in the East. This wasn't merely schadenfreude but also a shared sense of pride in the victory of Eastern nations in the East-West confrontation.
As a result, Japanese newspapers, while boasting about the benefits the Anglo-Japanese Alliance brought to Japan, subtly applauded the Chinese Expeditionary Force and the Indian people's resistance against Britain, showing no respect for their ally. This naturally attracted Japanese elites to gain a deeper understanding of India, rather than simply pointing out the geographical location of British India on a map.
Understanding the situations in China and India naturally left the impression on Japan's political and economic elites that if Japan could export its industrial products to these two populous countries, then Japan could, like Britain, build a maritime empire with the wealth of British India.
Mishima Yataro and Matsukata Kojiro are among the elites who hold this view. However, to date, Japan's political and business elites are still clueless about how to open up the Chinese and Indian markets; they are simply talking past each other or simply indulging in wishful thinking. Now, Lin Xinyi's proposed trilateral coal and iron cooperation plan provides a direction for opening up the Chinese and Indian markets.
Makino now understands why Matsukata Kojiro and Hayashi Shin-yi have become so close. This plan can not only bring huge economic benefits to Kawasaki Shipbuilding, but also bring great political benefits to the Matsukata family. What is even more valuable is that this plan is not even a concept, but a finished product that has already been prepared and placed on the table. Now all that is needed is to set out the bowls and chopsticks to enjoy it.
The only thing he didn't know was how much benefit the Matsukata family had taken. Strictly speaking, this plan had left them no room to intervene. No matter how good the plan was, if they could only stand by and watch, it was a bad plan for them as politicians. If the Matsukata family was only offering them scraps, Makino certainly wouldn't be so enthusiastic in advocating for it.
Makino, who saw further than Mishima, felt the pressure from the Navy and the Matsukata family. Even though he ultimately had to yield, he still reluctantly asked Matsukata Kojiro, "Matsukata-sensei is indeed a man of great ambition. The plan was only announced after it had been finalized to this extent. Now, those outside are still considering which British steel mill's equipment is the best to import. So, what are Matsukata-sensei's thoughts? Could you elaborate?"
Seeing the slight dissatisfaction in Makino's words, Matsukata Kojiro looked somewhat embarrassed. However, Lin Xinyi quickly came to his rescue, saying, "This plan hasn't been mentioned to Elder Matsukata yet. President Matsukata is sitting here today in two roles: the president of Kawasaki Shipyard and Mr. Matsukata himself. We've come to meet with Mr. Makino today hoping that you can join this plan and resolve the series of political and economic problems it encounters. If we can't handle it ourselves, then it won't be too late to ask Elder Matsukata and Elder Ito to step in. What do you say?"
Makino turned back to look at Hayashi Shinichi in surprise, then turned his gaze to Matsukata Kojiro, seemingly trying to confirm with his eyes whether what Hayashi Shinichi said was true. Facing the gazes of Makino and Mishima, Matsukata Kojiro was somewhat apprehensive, but gritted his teeth and nodded, saying, "Yes, Section Chief Hayashi is right. Today I am only representing myself and Kawasaki Shipyard, not the Matsukata family."
Makino felt momentarily disoriented. He had known the Matsukata brothers for quite some time, and he knew very well that neither of them were particularly talented. However, the elder brother, Matsukata Iwao, considered himself the heir to the Matsukata family and always bossed his younger brother around. Under the pressure of his elder brother, the younger brother, Matsukata Kojiro, was always obsequious. As the so-called president of Kawasaki Shipyard, most of the decisions were made by Matsukata Iwao, who then had his younger brother carry them out.
For example, Matsukata Ichiro, using his status as a veteran of the Matsukata clan, signed a contract with the navy to build warships. He then had Kawasaki Shipbuilding lend heavily to the Fifteenth Bank, which he managed, and channeled large sums of high interest into the bank. The shareholders of the Fifteenth Bank were mainly nobles, and the bank's excellent performance meant that the shareholders received generous dividends. Naturally, these shareholders were willing to support Matsukata Ichiro within the House of Nobles.
The only problem was that Matsukata Iwao himself lacked political acumen, and he ultimately became a pawn manipulated by others, wavering between the Inoyama and Itō factions within the aristocratic academy, and was unable to establish a solid foundation for the Matsukata faction within the academy.
Although the relationship between the two brothers was somewhat tense, under the restraint of Elder Matsukata and because Matsukata Kojiro's personality was relatively mild, the two brothers did not cause any scandals. However, Makino did not expect that Matsukata Kojiro would either remain inactive or make a big splash, completely overshadowing his older brother and father.
With Mishima's gentle nudge, Makino finally came to his senses. He calmed himself down and said to Matsukata Kojiro and Hayashi Shinji, "That's true. We can't trouble Elder Matsukata with everything. Some things are meant for us young people to do. So, how do you plan to move this project forward?"
The Navy's proposals for disarmament and East Asian peace were likely aimed at establishing a political foundation for trilateral cooperation. The Army's current opposition to disarmament does indeed threaten the Navy's efforts to promote trilateral cooperation between Japan, China, and India.
However, I still have a few questions. First, would the British Indian government allow the People's Committee of India to join this cooperation plan? The British viewed India as their backyard, and wouldn't they suppress any force attempting to approach India?
The second issue is that the conflict between our two countries revolves around two central issues: the ownership of the Korean Peninsula and the ownership of Manchuria. The Korean Peninsula is related to the security of the Japanese archipelago, while Manchuria is the only undeveloped large plain in East Asia. Although there are large areas of wilderness in Outer Manchuria and the coastal region occupied by Russia, the climate is too harsh. Developing Outer Manchuria, which is occupied by Russia, would be as difficult as developing Hokkaido. If these two issues cannot be resolved, then the foundation for trilateral cooperation will be unstable.
Although Makino was asking both Hayashi Shin'ichi and Matsukata Kojiro questions, Matsukata Kojiro only turned his gaze towards Hayashi Shin'ichi, clearly indicating that such political questions were still too difficult for him. Hayashi Shin'ichi, however, calmly replied to Makino: "The British certainly regard the Indian subcontinent as their backyard, but they cannot handle the self-development needs of the people living on this land."
The recent surge of the Indian national movement proves that British rule in India is not secure. No matter how many troops the British mobilize, India itself can organize an even larger resistance force. In the past, India was divided and ruled by the British for two reasons: first, the infighting among feudal lords in various parts of India gave the British an opportunity to take advantage of the situation; second, the Indian people lacked a unified national independence organization, so the armed forces resisting the British were consumed in internal strife.
However, the British suppression of the feudal lords in India has given the Indian people freedom of thought, and the British colonial rule over the Indian continent has made the Indian people realize that their suffering was not caused by the feudal lord or the neighboring princely states, but by an oppressor: the British Empire.
Freedom of thought gave the Indian people a reason to resist, while British colonial rule forced them to form a unified national and state consciousness. As a result, the power of the Indian People's Committee in the Bengal region grew day by day. British rule in the Bengal region was actually limited to urban areas, or even only to white-populated areas within cities.
Once the Indian people became aware and organized themselves, British rule in Bengal was the first to become unsustainable. Their decrees could no longer be confined to white-populated areas and cities. In many parts of Bengal, the People's Committees seized control of rural areas and launched land reform movements, striking at the forces of the landowning class who supported the British colonists.
The British were now considering two main issues: how to prevent an armed independence movement from erupting in British India, and how to stop the People's Committees and land reforms in Bengal from spreading beyond Bengal. According to my intelligence, the British were considering moving the British Indian government from Calcutta, or to the old Mughal capital in the north, or to the Bombay area.
Before the British transformed the various princely states into British India, there were already conflicts on the Indian subcontinent between the northern foreign regimes and the southern indigenous regimes, between the central and local governments in the Ganges and Indus River basins, and between agricultural conservatism in the upper and middle Ganges and commercial openness in the lower Ganges.
Therefore, the British will not resort to military repression against the People's Committee in the short term, as this would only further garner support from Indian nationalists. The British will likely revert to their earlier methods used against the princely states, inciting conflict between different regions, ethnicities, and religions in India, amplifying their differences, and ultimately leading the Indian people to fight against each other.
Under such circumstances, Britain might sabotage cooperation between Japan, China, and India in private, but it wouldn't do so openly. For us, confrontation with the British is actually unavoidable, because Japan cannot be confined to the area north of the Strait of Malacca; that would mean Britain would continue to control global shipping routes, jeopardizing Japan's maritime trade.
What we need is time for Japan's industrial power to grow strong enough to drive the British out of Southeast Asia, not to help Britain maintain its imperial hegemony. Therefore, there is no need to worry about British suppression. If the British don't suppress us, it means either Japan's strength does not threaten British interests, or Japan is on the path of national development envisioned by Britain. Neither of these options is good for Japan…”
Although Makino Nobuaki's political pursuits lay in his achievements in diplomacy, and thus he had conducted in-depth research on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance—Japan's role in securing its position in the international order—he still felt that Hayashi Shinji possessed profound insights into Japan and Britain's navigation rights in the Indian and South Pacific Oceans, as well as the status of the Indian subcontinent.
When Makino commented on Hayashi Nobuyoshi's diplomatic approach, Hayashi finally turned the topic to Japan-China relations. After a brief pause, he continued, "The Korean Peninsula is indeed of great importance to the security of both Japan and China..."
634
Although Lin Xinyi believes that the Korean Peninsula only serves a psychological security function for Japan, and that Japan would only be viewed with suspicion by continental countries, whether it was Russia in the past or China in the future, they would all feel hostile towards another major power that occupies the Korean Peninsula.
The Korean Peninsula, much like Outer Mongolia, can only maintain stability under the control of a major power in East Asia. Even if it were to become independent, it would only be able to serve as a small country not controlled by any major power, thus becoming a buffer zone between them.
However, if the Korean Peninsula falls into the hands of a major power, then to prevent that power from taking advantage of its weakness to attack, the major powers on the East Asian continent will inevitably take hostile actions against the power controlling the Korean Peninsula. After all, every country has periods of strength and weakness, and to prevent genocide during periods of decline, countries will choose to expand outwards during periods of strength to obtain sufficient security.
However, the security logic of maritime powers and land powers is different. Land powers do not allow other powers to control their surrounding areas, while maritime powers want to control maritime trade routes, because compared to land, maritime trade routes are more crucial to the survival of maritime nations.
Although Japan is an island nation, it has never had a maritime civilization. Japanese civilization originated from the influx of immigrants from the mainland, initially Koreans, and later Chinese. Its own indigenous civilization never truly developed. Therefore, the Japanese find it difficult to understand the ocean as an unobstructed passageway. Instead, they view the ocean with a continental mindset, seeing it as a vast moat filled with various dangers and unknowns.
It is precisely because of this continental mentality among the Japanese that Yamagata Aritomo's claim that the Korean Peninsula is Japan's security line resonated so deeply. Even within the navy, which relies on the sea for its livelihood, many supported the annexation of the Korean Peninsula without realizing that it would actually harm the navy's interests.
The fundamental reason why Yamamoto Gonnohyōe's island empire theory failed to gain widespread acceptance was that the Japanese, with their deep-seated continental mentality, refused to relinquish the Korean Peninsula, which they already had in their grasp. Even those who basically supported Yamamoto Gonnohyōe were still preoccupied with the Korean Peninsula. In this atmosphere, the island empire theory actually became a rhetoric used by the navy to counter the army, rather than a guiding principle that the navy truly wanted to implement.
Lin Xinyi also found it difficult to correct the current Japanese people's fascination with mainland countries, so he naturally did not refute Makino's concern about the Korean Peninsula. After thinking it over, he said to Makino: "In terms of the navy's defense concept, as long as the Korean Peninsula is not controlled by any mainland country, it is not a big deal to give it an independent status."
Japan's protection of the Korean Peninsula is essentially a way to prevent other major powers from having a base near Japan for attacking the Japanese mainland. As long as the Korean Peninsula is not in the hands of any major power, it will not become a base for a major power to attack Japan, and the same applies to China.
Therefore, the issue of the status of the Korean Peninsula between Japan and China is not about who owns the region, but about ensuring that the region does not become a threat to their own security. If Japan and China reach an agreement on preventing the Korean Peninsula from becoming a base for attacking either country, then the Korean issue can be resolved peacefully.
As for the importance of Manchuria to Japan, frankly speaking, it was more like the importance of an agricultural region to a region that was constantly industrializing. Because trade is essentially an exchange; simply put, people exchange their surplus labor, and thus, regular trade occurs.
Japan implemented the Family Registration Law in 1886, providing a basic census of the national population. At that time, the population of the Japanese archipelago was 3870.6 million. 25 years later, Japan's population had risen to 42.4 million, an increase of approximately 21.8%. If this growth trend continues on the mainland, and the populations of Korea, Ryukyu, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia are added, then Japan's population will likely approach 100 million in 50 years.
In order to feed this growing population, many intellectuals proposed the idea of emigration overseas. They saw the success of Europeans emigrating to the Americas and believed that Japan could replicate the European history of emigration.
However, I believe these intellectuals clearly haven't grasped the history of European immigration. Before the Industrial Revolution, the regions with the most overseas emigration were the European countries closest to the Americas; after the Industrial Revolution, the regions with the most emigration to the Americas were Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and other countries far from the Americas.
Why has the composition of European immigrants changed so much? The reason is actually quite simple: industrialization has led to cities absorbing a large number of wealthy rural laborers, and industries also need cheap labor to develop. Therefore, more industrialized European countries have improved the welfare of urban residents in order to entice rural laborers to migrate to cities rather than overseas.
Southern and Eastern European countries are predominantly agricultural, and it was difficult for them to acquire land for cultivation in their own countries. Therefore, emigration to the Americas became the best option. However, these immigrants were almost exclusively the more capable and established farmers in their home countries; impoverished tenant farmers lacked the resources to venture overseas.
Looking at my country's social situation, since the establishment of the private land ownership system, the number of self-cultivating farmers has declined rapidly, while the proportion of landlord families living in cities and completely off-farm has risen rapidly. The Navy conducted a preliminary investigation into this situation and found that landlord families living in cities and completely off-farm consumed far more than landlord families living in villages. Moreover, tenants had to convert their harvest into currency before paying rent, and the exploitation of tenants by landlords living off-farm was much more severe than that of landlords living in villages.
Therefore, if my country attempts to settle its agricultural population by seizing Manchuria and other mainland regions, it will only further lead to the disappearance of the domestic self-cultivating peasant class. If only tenant farmers and landlords remain in the countryside, the contradictions in the countryside will be much more serious than they are now.
Furthermore, the climate and environment of Manchuria are completely different from those of the North American Great Plains. If Manchuria were a region suitable for agriculture, the Chinese would have developed it long ago, turning it into a densely populated agricultural area like the North China Plain. Naturally, there would have been no room for the Manchus to rise to power.
It was precisely because of the harsh climate of Manchuria that the Han people were unwilling to leave the pass to cultivate the land, thus giving the Manchus room to grow and expand. The Russians' ability to reclaim land in Outer Manchuria is actually a recent phenomenon, only within the last few decades. Why couldn't the Russians reclaim land in Outer Manchuria in the past, but can now? Because the technology brought about by industrialization has overcome the natural environment of Outer Manchuria.
Therefore, the development of Manchuria was not as some people imagine, simply a matter of bringing landless peasants from across the country there, giving each of them a few hundred acres of land, and expecting them to settle down and live in peace. The development of Manchuria actually required substantial industrial investment, using machinery to conquer its harsh climate.
This is land that requires a large investment of machinery and capital to reap any benefits. Can Japan really invest heavily in building up Manchuria while simultaneously expanding its military to counter the threats posed by China and Russia to Manchuria? Doing so is not about expanding Japan's lifeline, but rather about investing Japan's vital resources in a region that could be occupied by an adversary at any time. This is called slow suicide.
Manchuria is indeed worth developing, but it shouldn't be occupied by force; that would be counterproductive. Developing Manchuria and Outer Northeast China requires the concerted efforts of Japan, China, and Russia. On the basis of a peace agreement among the three countries, defense costs should be significantly reduced, and those funds should be used for pioneering work in the region. Only in this way can everyone share the greatest benefits at the lowest cost.
Manchuria's agriculture and Japan's industry were complementary. It wasn't that Manchuria couldn't be traded with Japan's industry just because it wasn't under Japanese control. Manchuria's soybeans, wheat, timber, iron ore, and coal—resources that were difficult to quickly convert into cash for an unindustrialized China—were much-needed raw materials for Japan's industrial development.
Therefore, what we should consider is how to integrate Japanese industry into the development plans of Manchuria and Outer Northeast China, using the resources of Manchuria and Outer Northeast China to develop Japanese industry, thereby absorbing the surplus labor force in rural areas. In this way, Japan will benefit most of the fruits of the development of Manchuria, and Japan will not have to bear the costs of land reclamation and the military budget for defending Manchuria…”
Hayashi Shin-yi's explanation deeply shocked Makino, because he was one of the colonialists that Hayashi Shin-yi criticized. Basically, Japanese students studying in Europe would unconsciously worship imperialism and colonialism because they felt that the magnificent and advanced countries like Britain and France had developed under the guidance of imperialism and colonialism.
Students studying in the United States, however, are quite averse to imperialism and colonialism. After all, the United States grew up in the history of fighting against British imperialism and colonialism, and their criticism of imperialism and colonialism is a kind of political correctness. However, there are also many Americans who admire imperialism and colonialism. Although the Mexican-American War and the Spanish-American War were nominally against imperialism, they were actually the beginning of the United States becoming a member of the imperialist world.
Even if they say one thing and do another, the degree of freedom of thought in American society is unmatched by that of old Europe. Therefore, Japanese students who studied in the United States usually do not have a good impression of imperialism. At least on the surface, they do not approve of imperialism, and they do not consider enslaving Asians of the same skin color to be an honor.
However, we are now at the tail end of the Victorian era, and the power of the British Empire remains an insurmountable peak for Asians. Even after the Boer War and the Indian Revolt, the Japanese people's admiration and fear of Britain have not disappeared. Therefore, although many Japanese elites feel that the world is undergoing some kind of change and that Britain is being challenged around the world, they still firmly believe that Britain will defeat these challengers one by one, just as in the past few centuries, any country or nation that stands against Britain can never achieve victory.
However, Lin Xinyi's remarks still made Makino feel shaken. He admitted that the other party's idea was not an unrealistic fantasy. Many people oppose British imperialism and colonialism, but they only use American progressivism and liberalism to fight against it. They can't come up with an economic theory that can really break imperialism and colonialism.
Since the formation of the Meiji Restoration government, Japan has adopted European views on capitalism, believing that capitalism can create wealth and thus make the country strong. Imperialism and colonialism are essential conditions for the development of capitalism. Without the former's power, countries that pursue isolationist policies cannot be forced to open their domestic markets; without the latter's international gold standard, the resources of various countries cannot be transferred to industrialized nations and transformed into real wealth.
Progressivism and liberalism, strictly speaking, are merely criticisms of the capitalist way of distributing wealth. The purpose of this criticism is to counter the socialist idea of equal distribution, which is that if the ruling class does not undergo self-reform, the ruled class will become the mob of the French Revolution, ultimately destroying all good things by violence.
For hardline imperialists and colonialists, this weak reformist ideology was dismissed, because they believed that since they created social wealth, they should naturally distribute and enjoy it themselves, rather than providing relief to the poor. At this time, imperialists and colonialists generally believed that they had acquired this wealth through their own intelligence and courage, and that the laborers, without their guidance, could create nothing.
Lin Xinyi is now focusing on the exchange of surplus industrial and agricultural products, without emphasizing the value theory that labor creates social wealth. However, this exchange must be based on the value of labor, which he doesn't need to elaborate on. After all, Japanese capitalists are always thinking about how to exchange their worthless things for valuable industrial raw materials.
The exchange of agricultural products from Manchuria with Japanese industrial goods was certainly understandable to an elite like Makino. Even if he opposed the labor theory of value, he wouldn't turn down money. This exchange of industrial and agricultural products was clearly beneficial to Japan's industrial development.
Makino had to admit that the young man before him was able to unify the thinking within the navy not entirely through political maneuvering, but rather through a set of social operating principles that were acceptable to everyone. East Asian peace, the Korean Peninsula buffer zone, economic cooperation among Japan, China, and India, the development of Manchuria, the Chiba heavy industry center, and the military's disarmament—all of these things could now be viewed in connection.
Despite repeated contemplation, Makino couldn't disentangle the underlying logic, as these interconnected elements formed a cohesive whole. In comparison, the diplomatic affairs he had previously focused on seemed far too simplistic and ineffective in the face of Lin Xinyi's vision for national development and a new Asian order.
Makino felt this way because his diplomatic approach was based on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, with almost all diplomatic issues revolving around this alliance. This approach certainly saved Japan a lot of trouble, as Japan essentially turned its diplomacy into a branch of British influence in East Asia. Anyone wanting to challenge Japan's diplomacy in East Asia had to first consider the British attitude.
However, the diplomatic policy based on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance had significant flaws. First, Japanese diplomacy lost its independence and had to obey Britain's position on East Asian diplomacy, which was the reason for the tension in Japan-Russia and Japan-US relations.
Secondly, such diplomacy is unlikely to gain domestic public approval because the public doesn't see what diplomats know. They simply find it strange that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is protecting British interests instead of Japanese ones. Thus, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs enjoys a high degree of independence, it also significantly displeases the government and elder statesmen, as it effectively turns the government and military into appendages of the Ministry.
While Hayashi Shin-yi's proposed diplomatic policy negated the importance of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it provided the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a more solid foundation for the peaceful reconstruction of East Asia. This peaceful reconstruction clearly aligned with the expectations of the people and the government; aside from the military, no one wanted war, as war meant increased taxes and rising prices.
In this war against Russia, the Japanese army suffered at least 40,000 to 50,000 casualties, even after the Chinese had tied down the Russian army. Therefore, although the Hibiya Incident occurred in Tokyo, most of the troops on the Manchurian front were satisfied with the peace. Apart from the officers who were still resentful about the retreat, the soldiers were happy to be able to return to Japan alive.
Regarding the inability to force Russia to pay large sums of reparations, the soldiers believed, "There's nothing we can do. Russia's capital is too far away. If the war continued, it might not be over for ten years, and we might not be able to end the war gracefully while maintaining our advantage. This outcome is beneficial to everyone. We have completed our mission, driving the Russians out of Korea and Manchuria. Continuing to fight would only be pointless sacrifice..."
With the end of the war, demands for lower taxes and improved living standards gradually became the primary concerns of the domestic population. The tragic state of the wounded soldiers returning to Japan, in particular, terrified many young people, shattering their ideals of a war of honor. In the Sino-Japanese War and the Eight-Nation Alliance invasion of Beijing, Japanese soldiers suffered almost no wounded or disabled, but the Russians possessed a large number of artillery pieces, resulting in many soldiers suffering from limb loss.
Compared to the death toll, the number of wounded soldiers who become disabled is actually more damaging to ordinary people's yearning for war. While death can evoke a sense of self-pity for sacrificing for one's country, wounded soldiers missing limbs are a real burden on their families. In rural Japan, even able-bodied young people struggle to make ends meet; how can disabled people, who have lost their ability to work, support themselves? As for government compensation for wounded soldiers, it's only enough to last about six months, unless they are mid- to high-ranking officers who enjoy more benefits.
This is also the reason why the Ito Cabinet's image among the people has been getting better and better, because people have realized that everyone else is deceiving them. Although Ito's words are not pleasant to hear, they are the truth: war does not benefit ordinary people. Only by building in peace can everyone improve their lives.
635
Before this meeting, Makino Nobuaki still harbored the idea of winning over Hayashi Shinji. He considered himself the successor of the Okubo faction and had the idea of reunifying the Satsuma clique. However, he also knew that the navy, originally led by the Saigo family, would not easily align itself with the bureaucratic group of the Okubo faction. Therefore, he needed to cultivate a capable person of his own in the navy.
Although Makino had lofty ideals, he couldn't even unify the Okubo faction, and Matsukata Masayoshi's followers weren't enthusiastic about Makino's attempt to become the new leader of the Satsuma clique. Although Matsukata Masayoshi established himself within the Okubo faction as a disciple of Okubo, his true roots were actually as a follower of Shimazu Hisamitsu.
To Matsukata Masayoshi's followers, Okubo was merely a branch of the Satsuma clan, as were Saigo and Oyama; while the Matsukata lineage, with its deep ties to the Shimazu family, was the true line of the Satsuma clan.
Of course, Matsukata's ideas could not be accepted by other branches, which had long since rejected the Shimazu family's status as the overlord. They separated the Satsuma clique from the Satsuma domain, believing that although the Satsuma clique originated from the Satsuma domain, it was an anti-shogunate faction within the Satsuma clique, while the Satsuma clique was a faction that combined the imperial court and the military. The two sides were fundamentally opposed, and the Meiji Restoration was the result of the anti-shogunate faction defeating the faction that combined the imperial court and the military, not a compromise between the two sides.
Therefore, if Matsukata's disciples refer to themselves as members of the Okubo lineage, everyone will naturally acknowledge Matsukata Masayoshi's status as a representative of the Satsuma clique. Even if Matsukata and the Shimazu family have close ties in private, it will not affect Matsukata's status. As long as Matsukata Masayoshi does not openly bring up the Shimazu family, then everyone will have no choice but to part ways.
This is the biggest dilemma facing Matsukata's followers. Their desire to suppress the various factions within the Satsuma clique and establish Matsukata Masayoshi's legitimacy inevitably provokes strong opposition from the anti-shogunate faction, leading to their expulsion from the Satsuma clique. The theory of the union of the court and the military is now only discussed privately by some court nobles. The reason this theory is still being raised more than 40 years after the Meiji Restoration is that some want to elevate the Emperor's status, portraying the anti-shogunate movement as a war against the shogunate launched under the Emperor's guidance, rather than a rebellion of superiors by the four powerful domains.
However, not all the core members of the anti-shogunate faction have died yet, and they still hold considerable power. Not to mention these court nobles who have little power, even Matsukata Masayoshi does not dare to establish himself as the banner of the "union of court and military" theory. Therefore, the idea of Matsukata's disciples wanting to establish themselves as the mainstream of Satsuma can only be a hidden, icy block.
Why is Matsukata so determined to establish himself as the mainstream of the Satsuma clique? Because Matsukata was born in 1835 and is now over 73 years old. Once Matsukata loses his ability to think, it will not be so easy for Matsukata's disciples to continue to use the Satsuma clique's banner to gain benefits for themselves. After all, the Okubo faction still has younger forces represented by Makino and Mishima, and they certainly will not allow Matsukata's disciples to continue to hold the dominant position in the Satsuma clique.
Thus, while Matsukata Masayoshi and Makino Nobuaki had a close personal relationship, the relationship between Matsukata's disciples and Makino's supporters was somewhat distinct. Although neither side showed open antagonism, it was certain that they did not consider each other as one of their own.
Nobuaki Makino was constrained by the Matsukata faction. Nominally, Matsukata Masayoshi was grooming him as his successor, but in reality, Matsukata Masayoshi did not publicly state this. Moreover, Matsukata Masayoshi's attitude towards Yamamoto Gonbei also seemed to indicate that he regarded the other party as the head of the Satsuma clique. To think about it more cynically, wasn't the Matsukata elder using a means of mutual restraint between Yamamoto Kaisō and Nobuaki Makino?
While Makino pondered how to break the stalemate, Hayashi Shinji emerged as a rising star in the Navy. With the approval of Saigo Tsugumichi and the support of Ito, Kawahara, and others, Hayashi Shinji, despite his young age, had already become the young leader of the Satsuma faction in the Navy without any doubt, and even the Navy Minister Yamamoto could not shake his position.
Makino Nobuaki would certainly try to win over Hayashi Shinichi and make him a supporter in the Navy. At this time, although Makino admired Hayashi Shinichi very much, he did not regard him as an equal partner. After all, Hayashi Shinichi was too young. He and Mishima and others were regarded as the younger generation of the Satsuma clique, but in reality, they were all born in the 60s and were now in their early 40s.
Lin Xinyi was born in the 80s, at least 20 years younger than them, and not much older than Makino Nobuaki's eldest son. With such a huge age gap, Makino naturally found it difficult to accept that Lin Xinyi was on equal footing with him. In his view, Lin Xinyi was the next generation, not his competitor.
However, this meeting dispelled his underestimation of Lin Xinyi. From the moment Lin Xinyi was able to present such a complete set of political and economic logic, he could no longer treat him as a political novice. The current situation is that Makino himself cannot come up with a similar set of political and economic logic, which is the fundamental reason why he has been unable to unify the Okubo faction.
Makino was considered a rising star among the bureaucrats of the Okubo faction, not only because of his birth but also because he was a standout among the students who had studied abroad. His understanding of diplomacy, in particular, was truly remarkable. During the Meiji Restoration, the children of noble families who sent students to the West generally chose three fields: law, diplomacy, and education, while commoners mostly opted for science and engineering.
Makino Nobuaki was outstanding among the sons of nobles, but he studied British diplomacy, which was based on British politics, economics, culture, and military. Makino obviously did not study it in such depth, so he could only learn the specific policies of British diplomacy and found it difficult to understand the concepts and exchanges of interests behind these policies.
For this reason, although Makino's diplomatic ideas were refreshing after he returned to Japan, the veteran officials who came from the anti-shogunate era almost never used Makino's diplomatic ideas to guide Japan's diplomatic work. They still preferred to use their own confidants to manage diplomatic affairs.
Komura Jutaro, who was the same age as Makino and had also returned from studying abroad, chose to cooperate with the military after failing to promote the reform of Japan's diplomatic philosophy. He adjusted Japan's diplomatic work to match the military's expansionist defense policy. However, Makino admired British-style politics and opposed the military politics unique to Japan, so he could not unify the consensus of the Satsuma clique.
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